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Abstract 
 
Author: Cameron Jack Andrews  
Title: Micronesia in Modern Geopolitics 
 
After the Second World War, the United States established full strategic control over the South 
Pacific region of Micronesia. Under a United Nations agreement, America held Micronesia as a 
“Strategic Trust Territory” during the Cold War, eventually acceding to the islanders’ demands 
for political self-determination. Throughout this period, the US failed to maintain coherent policy 
priorities and treated the islanders as second-class negotiating partners. Today, Micronesia is 
comprised of three states in “free association” with the United States: the Federated States of 
Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, and the Republic of Palau, as well as the 
American territories of Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
 
Micronesia lies geographically in the heart of the Asia-Pacific and continues to be of great 
strategic importance to the United States. In the coming decades, the rise of China will 
significantly alter the geopolitical status quo in Micronesia. The potential loss of Micronesia to 
China would be a substantial blow to America’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific, and would 
be deeply damaging to American interests. US policymakers should consider the nature of this 
threat and create policy that meets the Chinese challenge in the Micronesia region.  
 
This thesis will provide a political history of Micronesia to the present day, describe the unique 
relationship between America and the freely associated states, and discuss the geopolitical issues 
currently facing the region. Overall, I intend for this thesis to provide a basic primer on 
Micronesia, and a broader look at the region’s role in global geopolitics.  
 
Supervising Professor: Michael R Anderson, PhD  
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I. Introduction to Micronesia 
"Our ancestors, who made their homes on these islands, displaced no other people.   
We, who remain, wish no other home than this. Having known war, we hope for peace.   
Having been divided, we wish unity. Having been ruled, we seek freedom." 
Preamble to the Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia1 
“The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay." 
Barack Obama2  
Micronesia is a misnomer. The Greek word for “small islands” was imposed by 
westerners as a way of contrasting the region’s tiny and scattered islands with the far larger 
archipelagos of Polynesia and Melanesia. Although the majority of the Micronesian islands are 
indeed small, they are quite numerous and deeply diverse; ranging from the large, plateau-like 
island of Guam to tiny sand spits in the Marshalls covered at high tide. Micronesia, as commonly 
understood, includes the Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Island chains. These three groupings 
are themselves are western inventions, and paper over the deep linguistic and cultural diversity 
found throughout and within the islands. On Guam, one is greeted with the Chamorro greeting of 
Hafa Adai, in Pohnpei by Kaselehlie, and in Chuuk Lagoon with Ran Annim. The myriad 
peoples of Micronesia, from the cosmopolitan casino-owning, English-speaking Chamorros of 
Saipan to the atoll-dwelling navigators of Satawal Island, all have their own interpretations of 
their islander identities that are far richer than the simple label “Micronesian.” Throughout this 
thesis, I will refer to the geographic and political region of Micronesia mindful of the diversity of 
cultures and deep history among the region’s more than 2,000 islands.   
                                                          
1
 “Constitution of the Federated States of Micronesia.” Preamable 
2
 McHenry, Micronesia, Trust Betrayed, 87. 
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The Caroline, Marshall, and Mariana Islands lie geographically in the heart of the Asia-
Pacific. They sit between Japan and Indonesia on a north-south axis and between the Philippines 
and Hawai’i on an east-west axis. In recent history, this interior position has saddled the islands 
with outsized geopolitical relevancy, especially during wartime. The airfields and anchorages of 
Micronesia were the springboard for the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and consequently 
became a bloody battleground between the Japanese and Americans during the Pacific War. 
When the war ended and American rule came to Micronesia, the Marshallese atolls of Eniwetok 
and Bikini became the proving grounds for America’s arsenal of increasingly destructive nuclear 
weaponry. Today the Micronesian islands continue to make the daily news. At the time of 
writing, North Korean dictator Kim Jong-Un is threatening to fire a nuclear missile at Guam, 
Micronesia’s largest island and America’s key military stronghold and logistical hub in the 
central Pacific.  
 The native people of the islands have experienced shockingly rapid social, religious, and 
cultural change over the past two centuries. Europeans arrived in earnest throughout the 18
th  
and 
19
th
 centuries, introducing their religions, technologies, vices, and diseases to the native people. 
The islands saw a quick succession of several colonial masters, the devastation of history’s 
largest naval war, and then the destructive power of nuclear weapons. The changes to the 
islanders’ societies and psyches brought about by this tumultuous history are not to be 
underestimated. Above all, Micronesians have a keen understanding of the importance of their 
islands to the outside world, and have developed an ethos of shrewd political pragmatism to 
adapt and survive in the world they have found themselves in. 
Today, the Micronesian islands are firmly under the strategic control of the United States. 
Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are American territories, while the three semi-
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independent nations of Micronesia exist in “Compacts of Free Association” with America.  
Micronesians hold a wide range of opinions on this political arrangement, but few see it as 
perfect. Among many, there is a sort of consensus that their resource-poor islands and atolls 
require a foreign benefactor to maintain a minimum standard of living. However, the inadequacy 
of American policy in fully meeting the region’s challenges has long been apparent. Most 
frustrating, America has failed to develop and maintain coherent policy priorities and for decades 
has treated the islanders as second-class political partners.  
 With the rise of China looming over the Asia-Pacific, the United States cannot continue 
to consider Micronesia as indefinitely in the American camp. Indeed, America can expect 
China’s geopolitical interests to expand into Micronesia as its political, economic, and military 
influence continue to grow. Already there are indications that China is seeking to make inroads 
across Oceania. Should America continue to neglect its relationships with the Compact states, it 
is possible if not probable that China will displace the United States as the predominant power in 
Micronesia. This thesis is first and foremost intended to inform the reader about an understudied 
and underappreciated topic – Micronesia. Chapters II and III are a political history of 
Micronesia, respectively focusing on the periods before and after American governance of the 
region. Chapter IV is an overview of the modern US-Micronesian relationship, using this as 
context to frame the current policy questions about the role of Micronesia in global geopolitics. 
For the remainder of this chapter, I offer a brief tour of the island groups of Micronesia in order 
to better acquaint the reader with the geography and diversity of these remote and mysterious 
islands.   
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Figure 1: A Map of the South-Central Pacific with American Micronesia outlined in red. Note the Caroline Islands 
in the center-bottom, the Mariana Islands in the center-top, and the Marshall Islands to the right. 
3
 
The Federated States of Micronesia 
 Comprising the largest portion of Micronesia, the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 
is a massive four-state federation with a population of just over 102,000.4 Four high-rising 
islands are the political, economic, and cultural hearts of the Federation. At least seven major 
languages are spoken in FSM, and no ethnic group comprises the majority. FSM has developed 
into a surprisingly successful multiethnic democracy – transitions of power are frequent and 
peaceful, and ethnic strife exceedingly rare. On the other hand, FSM has long struggled to 
develop a functioning market economy and remains deeply poor. Like the other independent 
nations of Micronesia, FSM is in a “Compact of Free Association” with the United States. The 
four major states of FSM, and their respective island capitals, are as follows: 
 Kosrae (previously known as Kusaie) is a sleepy, remote island and the easternmost state 
of FSM. About 6,600 Micronesians live on Kosrae, which is unique among the FSM states in 
                                                          
3
 “Oceania Map.” Central Intelligence Agency 
4
 Francis X. Hezel and Levin, “Survey of Federated States of Micronesia Migrants in the United States Including 
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).” 
Andrews 8 
 
that it is a single island, with no outlying atolls under the state's jurisdiction.5 Flights to Kosrae 
are infrequent, and a handful of tourists visit every year to stay at eco-lodges and dive around the 
island’s pristine coral reefs. Kosrae was once a united, hereditary monarchy, but the traditional 
political system was abandoned during the period of American rule.6  
 Pohnpei (previously known as Ponape) is a mountainous island that serves as the capital 
of the Federated States. The island is round and roughly a fifth the size of Oahu, with a 
population of just over 36,000.7 The Capital of Pohnpei State, Kolonia, is a small but busy town 
hosting the island’s only airport. The island is brimming with government agencies: embassies, 
bureaus, commissions, departments, and divisions of all sorts make their home on Pohnpei, 
converting foreign aid into working class jobs for islanders. 
 The unending rains, dowering humidity, and thick mangrove jungles make Pohnpei a 
dower place. There are no beaches on the island – instead, the water is met only by thick and 
muddy mangrove swamps. New public buildings look years-worn as soon as they are completed 
(if they ever are – many make it only halfway up before running out of money or tangled in red 
tape). Freshly-repainted used cars, imported from Japan, quickly lose their sheen. Their fate is 
often to lay strewn along the roadside, windows shattered, tires flat, with coconut trees and 
mangroves sprouting from the driver’s seat. Husks of abandoned ships, red with rust, litter the 
sides of Kolonia’s harbor. It is not the fault of the Pohnpeians, but their environment. The 
environment of the island is lush, verdant, and all-consuming. Anything left outside on Pohnpei 
lives on borrowed time.   
 Pohnpei maintains a somewhat robust system of chiefly authority. The paramount chief, 
the Nahmwarki, holds influence over the island’s lower chiefs, who manage systems of 
                                                          
5
 FSM Government, “FSM 2010 Census.” 
6
 Hezel, Petteys, and Chang, “Sustainable Human Development in FSM.” 
7
 FSM Government, “FSM 2010 Census.” 
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patronage in their respective tribal networks. Chiefs manage the distribution of tribal and familial 
property, hold feasts, and grant honorifics or gifts. Driving on Pohnpei’s single ring road, you 
will find yourself in such bizarre entities as the “Kingdom of U”, both a legal subdivision of 
Pohnpei and a traditional tribal area headed by a hereditary chief.  
 Chuuk (previously known as Truk) is a collection of small rocky islands enclosed in a 
coral lagoon. Chuuk is the most populous and least developed state of FSM, with over 48,000 
inhabitants.8 The Capital of Chuuk State is Weno, a small town hugging the sides of a small, 
mountainous island and hosting Chuuk’s single-runway airport. Outside of Weno, most 
Chuukese are strewn throughout the other islands in the lagoon. Many live in villages lacking 
basic utilities like running water and electricity that are commonplace on Pohnpei. Chuukese 
with ambition typically leave their home island – either to Weno (home to Micronesia’s best 
private school, the Jesuit-run Xavier High School), to Pohnpei to work in FSM government, or to 
Hawai’i, Guam, and the mainland United States on Compact migration privileges, where they 
tend to work in low-skill, labor-intensive industries.   
 Chuuk is infamous for its somewhat high crime rate, and likewise Chuukese have a rather 
poor reputation across most of Oceania. On Pohnpei, FSM officials disdain the numerous 
Chuukese for their outsized influence in the multi-ethnic Federation government. In Guam and 
Hawai’i, they are often stereotyped for their homelessness and criminality. Interestingly, Chuuk 
lacks a tradition of hereditary tribal chiefs, instead having a system similar to the “Melanesian 
Big-Man Societies” to the South. Before the period of German rule, Chuuk was not governed in 
any meaningful sense. Individuals lived in small family fiefdoms that rarely grew or consolidated 
and only entered into “impermanent and shaky arrangements aimed at gaining support at time of 
                                                          
8
 FSM Government. 
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war.”9 It is thus not unreasonable to speculate that Chuuk’s violent reputation in part stems from 
its anarchic history. 
Yap is the westernmost state of FSM, a small, hilly island known for its preservation of 
traditional Micronesian culture. Home to just over 11,000 individuals, the island is still organized 
around traditional village tribes.10 Yap is also home of the famous rai, the giant stone money by 
the precolonial Yapese as markers of wealth and status. The stone coins are sometimes as large 
as buildings – and rarely can be moved from place. Traditional dress is still in use, and many 
Yapese women go topless and wear traditional grass skirts. The traditional culture in Yap has 
been sustained partly due to the island’s reluctance to embrace the outside world. The tribal 
chiefs of Yap have long been more skeptical of outsiders than those of Palau or Pohnpei, and 
maintained a tight grip on their people throughout the 20
th
 century’s procession of colonial 
masters. More than any other groups of Micronesians, the Yapese have rejected tourism, 
internationalism, and capitalism in favor of maintaining their traditional social systems. Change 
on Yap thus arrives far more slowly than elsewhere in the major Micronesian islands. 
Commonalities of the Federated States of Micronesia 
Despite the unique cultural heritage of the four states, they share several important 
characteristics. For most Micronesians, church is a highly significant social institution. From the 
mid-1850s to today, foreign missionaries from various Christian denominations have come to 
Micronesia in order to spread their gospels to the previously pagan islanders. This includes 
mainstream denominations: Catholicism, Episcopalianism, and Anglicanism are all entrenched in 
Micronesia, and the role of Catholicism is especially important as the church maintains a 
network of relatively high-quality private schools. However, this missionary tradition has also 
                                                          
9
 Hezel, Petteys, and Chang, “Sustainable Human Development in FSM.” 
10
 FSM Government, “FSM 2010 Census.” 
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attracted more fringe Christian groups: including Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, and Seventh-
Day Adventists. These more esoteric Christian denominations are gaining followers in the 
islands, where they are free from the some of the social stigma they face elsewhere.  
Outside of the main islands there are many inhabited coral atolls scattered across FSM in 
the states of Yap, Chuuk, and Pohnpei. Most atolls are highly remote – often hundreds of miles 
from the nearest other piece of land. Most lack airstrips and telecommunications, and are 
connected to the outside world only by infrequent boat visits that bring basic provisions. Two 
atolls in FSM, Kapingamarangi and Nakuro, are ethnically Polynesian, while the remainder are 
ethnically Micronesian. For many who grow up on atolls – tiny scraps of land, supported only by 
taro or coconut patches – their small islands are the entirety of their world. It is an exceedingly 
remote existence in an already isolated region of the world.  
The Republic of Marshall Islands 
The Marshall Islands are a collection of 29 low-lying coral atolls divided into two chains, 
the ratak and ralik. The vast majority of the 53,000 Marshallese are atoll-dwellers, divided 
between the highly urbanized atolls of Majuro and Kwajalein and the 27 other, more remote 
islands.11 Together, they are governed by the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) in free 
association with the United States. The Republic’s capital, Majuro, is a crowded city anxiously 
resting upon a large, low-lying coral atoll, no more than 100 meters in width at any one point.  
A few hundred miles northwest of Majuro is the 97-island Kwajalein Atoll, of which 11 
are leased to the United States as the Ronald Reagan Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site. The 
southernmost island, affectionately known as “Kwaj” by its over 1,000 American military 
personnel, hosts most of the base infrastructure, including an American-style suburb complete 
                                                          
11
 Economic Policy, Planning, and Statistics Office and Office of the RMI President, “RMI-2011-Census-Summary-
Report-on-Population-and-Housing.pdf.” 
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with recreational facilities, a supermarket, and movie theater. Slightly to the North, over 10,000 
Marshallese occupy the tiny island of Ebeye, attracted by the prospect of jobs on Kwaj. Ebeye is 
one of the most densely populated islands on Earth – and conditions, while not third-world, are 
far below American standards.  
Poverty is not the only issue facing the RMI. The Marshalls’ low-lying geography make 
the islands uniquely vulnerable to climate change. Rarely does the land pinched in the middle of 
a coral atoll exceed six meters in altitude, so even a modest change in sea level could erase or 
make uninhabitable many of the atolls. Should sea level rise meet even more conservative 
projections, many of the Marshalls will need to be permanently relocated.    
As in Yap, traditional hereditary chiefs in the Marshalls have far more power than they 
do elsewhere in Micronesia. The irooj (chiefs) have a dedicated House of Congress, and 
maintain strong land rights and traditional authority within their communities.12 This is not to 
overstate Marshallese conservatism, as the victory of Hilda Heine in the 2016 Marshallese 
Presidential Elections made the Marshall Islands the first Micronesian nation to have a female 
head of state. 
Of course, the Marshall Islands are most well-known as the site of American nuclear 
testing from 1946 to 1962. Starting with the testing of 2 fission bombs on Bikini atoll in 1946, 66 
nuclear weapons were detonated on Marshallese atolls, the testing ground for the world’s first 
hydrogen bombs.13 The effects of radiation and the relocation of the natives from the so-called 
“Pacific Proving Grounds” remain a perennial public health and political issue in the Marshalls.  
                                                          
12
 Walsh, “Imagining the Marshalls: Chiefs, Tradition, and the State on the Fringes of US Empire.” 
13
 Hezel, Strangers in Their Own Land : A Century of Colonial Rule in the Caroline and Marshall Islands. 273 
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The Republic of Palau 
 Palau is a chain of 340 islands and the westernmost region of the Caroline Islands, only 
1000km to the east of the Philippines. The just over 21,000 residents of Palau are far wealthier 
than those of Micronesia and the Marshalls, as the islands host a thriving tourism industry that 
mostly caters to visitors from East Asian.14 The Palauan island chain, extending some 1,000 
miles southwest of the Marianas, is far closer to Asia than the rest of Micronesia. Palau is also 
home to a large Asian expatriate population. Palauans see their country as distinct from the 
remainder of Micronesia – in general they are far more outgoing than other Micronesians, and 
are known as the ambitious go-getters of the region.  
 Despite the islands’ relative wealth, of the three Compact states Palau has been the most 
politically dysfunctional. Palau rejected the Micronesian Constitution in 1979, and could not 
reach an agreement for de jure independence until 1994. The first President of Palau, Haruo 
Remeliik, was murdered on the job, while the second, Lazarus Salii, committed suicide amid a 
political firestorm.15 In more recent years, Palauan politics have stabilized, but some 
governments have continued acting unscrupulously. In the late 2000s, the islands became a 
haven for money laundering and tax avoidance with the tacit permission of the government – an 
arrangement eventually ended under intense international pressure. Given Palau’s geographic 
proximity to Asia and its somewhat self-sustaining economy, it is the Compact state with by far 
the most fragile political relationship with the United States. 
                                                          
14
 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook — (Palau).” 
15
 Arnold Leibowitz, Embattled Island: Palau’s Struggle for Independence. 
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The Territory of Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands 
 Guam is the largest and most populous island in Micronesia, and a territory of the United 
States since 1898. Over 167,000 individuals of several ethnic groups reside on Guam.16 To its 
tourism promoters, Guam is “Where America’s Day Begins!”, but to America’s strategic 
planners, the island is America’s “Gibraltar of the Pacific”, an impregnatable fortress home to a 
major American air and naval base.17 Geographically, the 543 km
2 
island of Guam is part of the 
Mariana Islands, with whom they share a common Chamorro ethnic heritage. It is the largest 
island in Micronesia, and the second-most visited island in the Pacific by foreign tourists – 
banking nearly 1.5 million every year, mostly from East Asia.
18
 Guam’s economy, fueled by 
tourism and the presence of the US military, is therefore quite prosperous. The island is also 
multi-ethnic, cosmopolitan, and deeply interconnected with major economies of East Asia.  
To the north, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) is another 
American territory that together with Guam comprise the Mariana island chain. Around 52,000 
individuals live in the Northern Mariana Islands.19 There are 15 islands in the CNMI, though the 
vast majority of the Commonwealth’s population lives in the southern islands of Saipan, Tinian, 
and Rota. CNMI, like Guam, shares a Chamorro heritage and has embraced tourism and real 
estate as major economic engines. As a result, the Mariana Islands, Guam included, are far more 
prosperous and cosmopolitan than the Compact nations to the South.  
The Micronesian Diaspora 
 The Compacts of Free Association have allowed Micronesians unrestricted immigration 
and work privileges in the United States. With these privileges, tens of thousands Micronesians 
                                                          
16
 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook — (Guam).” 
17
 Rogers, “Guam’s Strategic Value.” 
18
 Hezel, Interview with Father Fran. Hezel by Cameron Jack Andrews. 
19
 Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook — (CNMI).” 
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have moved to America. Most numerous are the Micronesians in Guam, Hawai’i, and Saipan, 
where many find work as standard low-wage immigrant workers: housekeepers, cooks, clerks, 
and janitors. In Honolulu, Micronesians are numerous enough to have their own neighborhoods, 
grocery stores, and aid clinics that cater especially to their needs. In Guam, many work in 
construction and other labor-intensive industries.  
 Interestingly, the Micronesian diaspora is becoming entrenched throughout the 
continental United States. The number of Compact immigrants is not effectively counted by the 
US Census, so it is highly difficult to ascertain their true number. However, according to a 2012 
study by Fran Hezel and Dr. Michael J Levin, the FSM population in the United States totals 
49,840 – including 16,790 born on American soil.20 According to FSM’s official 2010 Census, 
there are just over 102,000 individuals in FSM itself, a number that has been slowly decreasing.21 
Thus, about one in three FSM Micronesians live in the United States, one of the highest rates of 
per capita migration to the United States of any country worldwide. Although a similar count has 
not been conducted for the Marshallese, it is widely believed among Micronesia experts that 
immigration from the Marshall Islands is of comparable scale. These Micronesians have settled 
in places as diverse as Oklahoma, Arkansas, and Minnesota. Enid, Oklahoma developed a 
Marshallese community around 250, who affectionately call the town “Enid Atoll.” Three hours 
to the east, over 2,000 Marshallese live in Springdale, Arkansas, mostly working in a Tyson 
Chicken plant. Springdale’s Marshallese population is so substantial that the Marshall Islands 
maintains a consulate in the town. Surveys of Micronesian immigrants have also suggested that 
those who migrate to the mainland fare better economically than those who migrate to other 
                                                          
20
 Francis X. Hezel and Levin, “Survey of Federated States of Micronesia Migrants in the United States Including 
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI).” 
21
 FSM Government, “FSM 2010 Census.” 
Andrews 16 
 
island territories.
22
 Though the exact trends in Micronesian migration are difficult to study, it 
seems that increasing numbers of Micronesians are using their Compact immigration privileges 
to move to the United States and are establishing permanent islander communities on the 
American mainland. This understudied wave of Micronesian migration, among other aspects that 
will be discussed in this thesis, is reflective of the unique relationship that the United States has 
with the region. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22
 Hezel, “Micronesians on the Move: Eastward and Upward Bound.” 33 
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II. Five Empires in Micronesia 
“[The Carolines] are not worth it. The islands would not repay one week of preparation for war.” 
-Otto von Bismarck, 188523  
 “The next time you have a war, please don’t have it here.” 
-Micronesian Woman to UN Trusteeship Council, 194724 
The Micronesian islands are so distant, scattered, and small that they can seem the very 
archetype of isolation. Even today, their combined population is only barely equivalent to that of 
Tulsa, Oklahoma. The oceans separating the Carolines, Marshalls, and Marianas from Asia look 
deceptively small on a world map – in reality, outside of the cosmopolitan Marianas, Micronesia 
is a slow and disconnected place. On the more distant atolls, isolation is at the heart of island life. 
Despite this isolation, Micronesia’s regional position in the heart of the Asia-Pacific has made 
the region incredibly important for foreign powers seeking to project power and facilitate trade in 
the Asia-Pacific.  
 This chapter is intended to offer a political history of Micronesia from Ferdinand 
Magellan’s chance encounter with Guam in 1521 to the beginning of American administration. 
This history is by no means comprehensive, but will provide context for the present-day political 
questions that are the focus of this thesis. During this period, foreign powers, first Europeans and 
then Japanese and Americans, viewed control of the Micronesian islands as important to their 
national aspirations. Taken as a single narrative, Micronesian history is the rather surprising 
story of how some of the world’s most remote islands transformed into a central battleground of 
world geopolitics.  
                                                          
23
 Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization: A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 
1521-1885. 311 
24
 Hanlon, Remaking Micronesia. 
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The Micronesian Islands and European Contact (Prehistory-1780) 
The atolls and islands of Micronesia were originally settled by peoples of the 
Austronesian ethno-linguistic group, who migrated from Southeast Asia on ocean-going 
canoes.25 The settlement of Oceania was gradual but comprehensive. By the time Europeans 
began exploring the deep Pacific, the vast majority of islands were home to indigenous 
civilizations of varying degrees of sophistication. The larger rocky islands or island groups – 
Guam, Pohnpei, Palau, and Yap – were generally ruled by lose tribal confederations led by 
hereditary chiefs. The chiefs presided over complex social systems that could have as many as 
five distinct social castes. Tribal confederations would compete for group status and control of 
large island groups, sporadically fighting to retain the loyalties of outlying villages and atolls. 
Smaller rocky islands typically had simpler systems of political organization. On Kosrae, a 
single hereditary chief held all authority. On the islands of Chuuk Lagoon, smaller kin-groups 
were the main unit of social organization. Throughout the Marshalls, where the atolls are 
arranged closely in the Ralik and Ratak chains, confederations among atolls were frequent. More 
remote atolls had even more basic social systems, which each typically having a chief who led a 
relatively egalitarian tribe, sometimes paying tribute to a far-off island.  
Larger Micronesian islands briefly developed centralized states. On Pohnpei, the 
Saudeleur Dynasty upended the island’s tribal system and established a monarchy centered in the 
extensive stone city of Nan Madol, ruling for at least 500 years over a peak population of 
perhaps 25,000 islanders.26 However, the Sandelaur state collapsed before substantial European 
contact began. Similar ruins on Kosrae and Saipan attest to other pre-contact civilizations that 
have been lost to time. Without written languages, archeological records and oral histories are all 
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that is available to speculate on the nature of these societies, though there is little doubt that they 
were highly sophisticated. However, the decline of such civilizations does indicate that in the 
long-run, sophisticated states had difficulty sustaining themselves on the small and resource-poor 
Micronesian islands. 
Cyclical population booms and busts came every few generations, as small islands are 
highly vulnerable to overpopulation. Over time the population of an island like Pohnpei would 
gradually increase until suddenly declining from disease, natural disaster, or the collapse of 
political institutions. Some islands and local cultures adapted to this reality. Shocked European 
visitors documented infanticide among the Marshallese, some of whom would smother their 
third baby in the sands of the beach to prevent overpopulation.27 Later on, the gradual arrival of 
European diseases would decimate Micronesian populations, first in the Mariana Islands and 
then centuries later in the Carolines and Marshalls.  
Written Micronesian history begins with Spanish explorer Ferdinand Magellan’s chance 
encounter with the island of Guam in 1521. The native Chamorro people of the Marianas islands, 
unaccustomed to European ideas of private property, boarded Magellan’s ship and promptly 
began hauling off nearly everything that was not tied down. Magellan removed the islanders 
from his ship by force and then promptly continued onwards to the Philippines. Following 
Magellan’s assessment of the natives, the Spanish called Guam the “Isle of Thieves” throughout 
the two centuries to follow.28 Deeper into the Spanish colonial period, well-intentioned Jesuits 
renamed Magellan’s “Ladrones Islands” to the more dignified “Guam.” 
The Spanish returned to the Mariana Islands a few decades later after successfully 
conquering the Philippines, claiming the islands as part of the “Spanish East Indies” and using 
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them as a trading and navigation waypoint for their disparate colonial empire. On Guam and the 
other Mariana Islands, there passed the standard sort of Spanish Colonialism: Iberian settlers 
moved onto the islands, missions and churches were built, and natives were compelled to adopt 
Spanish language, culture, and religion. Meanwhile, disease substantially reduced the Chamorro 
population, perhaps by upwards of 90%. Here in the Spanish conquest, the historical trajectory of 
the Mariana Islands diverges significantly from that of the Carolines and Marshalls, which were 
not extensively colonized until the arrival of the Japanese in the 20
th
 century. To this day, the 
Marianas are the most Hispanicized of the Micronesian islands, retaining substantial elements of 
Spanish religion and culture.  
To the South, the Carolines and Marshalls initially escaped direct European control. At 
the peak of Spanish Imperial Era, Spanish explorers made sporadic expeditions to the southern 
islands. However, overstretched and in relative decline, the Spanish ultimately did not extend 
their colonial dominion south of Guam, and the islands would remained mostly untouched (and 
uncharted) until the late 1700s, though the Spanish crown still officially considered all of 
Micronesia as rightful Spanish territory. After the period of Spanish interest in Southern 
Micronesia following Magellan to the complete cessation of Spanish exploration in 1733, the 
Carolines and Marshalls were re-isolated from the outside world for another half-century. The 
islands were simply too remote and scarce in natural resources to induce any sustained effort at 
colonization further than that already undertaken in the Marianas.   
The “Age of Adventure” (1783-1886) 
 In the late 18
th
 century, the Caroline and Marshall Islands were gradually “rediscovered” 
by the British, who headed a vast merchant fleet that was highly active in the Asia-Pacific.29 In 
                                                          
29
 Hezel, The First Taint of Civilization: A History of the Caroline and Marshall Islands in Pre-Colonial Days, 
1521-1885. 60 
Andrews 21 
 
1783, the damaged British merchant ship Antelope ran into Palau in route to Canton. 
Unbeknownst to both the British and Palauans, the arrival of the Antelope on Palau was the 
beginning of a new historical era in the Caroline and Marshall islands. The Antelope incident and 
the subsequent era of European contact dramatically changed Micronesia. After 1783, the islands 
would gradually become more exposed to the outside world, as well as objects of the political 
ambitions of foreign powers.  
Ashore in Palau, the Antelope’s crew gleefully intervened in island politics. The ibedul 
(high chief) of Palau was quick to recognize the disruptive potential of European firearms, and 
requested the service of five English musketeers in his ongoing dispute with other tribal 
confederations in exchange for feeding the marooned crew and allowing them to repair their 
vessel. The five armed men were more than enough to deliver an easy victory. According Fran 
Hezel, the Antelope left “a deep appreciation for the value of gunpowder in the struggle for 
political ascendency among the local villages, and a strong desire to continue to use foreigners as 
powerful allies in this struggle.”30 This knowledge, and these sorts of interactions, would soon 
spread across the Carolines.  
After the ship was repaired, one of the English musketeers elected to stay behind. The 
otherwise unremarkable Englishman Madan Blanchard was the first of the Micronesian 
“beachcombers,” a term for the Europeans who left or deserted their ships to live a more exotic 
life in Oceania. Within months, Blanchard “had discarded his clothes, had himself tattooed, and 
gone entirely naked.”31 He would not be the last; hundreds of washed up European and American 
sailors would escape to Micronesia in much the same way. They were convicts escaping Europe, 
African former slaves escaping their past in the New World, or eclectic adventure-seekers with 
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nothing to lose. All settled into a new social role. Beachcombers served as retainers to local 
chiefs, mediating the trade in gunpowder and acting as liaisons with new European visitors. Most 
took local wives and adopted some manner of local culture, although not all followed Blanchard 
in fully ditching their clothes for tattoos. In the post-Antelope political era we begin to identify 
the first examples of how the islanders handled the new visitors. The Micronesians were neither 
fierce resistors of colonialism nor weak-willed natives wowed by the supposed sophistication of 
their European visitors. Instead, they were typically savvy political operators, making the best of 
the rapidly changing state of affairs.  
 Further British expeditions established similar arrangements on Yap and Pohnpei, and in 
subsequent years most of the Western Carolines were charted by British ships.32 However, 
Micronesia soon developed a purpose in itself for the Chinese trade – as the British learned that 
the Chinese upper classes would trade their valuable teas, silks, and spices for bêche-de-mar (sea 
cucumber), sandalwood, turtle shells, and edible bird nests, all of which were abundant in the 
Micronesian islands. Copra (dried coconut) was also in demand worldwide. As British (and to a 
lesser degree, French and American) navigators discovered more islands in Carolines in the 
1820s and 1830s, more beachcombers settled variously where local chiefs permitted and began 
informal trading houses, selling barrels of bêche-de-mar and crates of copra for gunpowder and 
iron, which they would exchange with their chiefly patrons for social status and wives. In 
addition to flooding Micronesia with firearms, the beachcombers introduced the islands to 
tobacco and liquor, which would become immensely socially disruptive. 
As more and more foreigners interacted with the Caroline and Marshall Islands, the 
predominance of the beachcomber gave way to the trader and missionary. With European roots 
became more entrenched, formal trading houses moved into the Micronesian islands, working 
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directly with local chiefs and ditching the ignoble beachcomber middlemen. Missionaries from 
Catholic and Protestant sects also began setting up churches in the Carolines, working with 
varying degrees of success to save the souls of the natives. Within decades, majorities on every 
Carolinian and Marshallese island group had embraced one sort or another of Christianity. These 
mass conversions were often disruptive to the traditional chiefly authority systems of 
Micronesia, and mark one of the first examples of Micronesians embracing western culture.  
 Additionally, the arrival of the British marks the first time that any sort of international 
order was extended to Micronesia. Cases of murder by European seamen and beachcombers 
were tried in courts in Hong Kong. The British overall began to establish a sort of legal order, 
keeping the peace between chiefs, prosecuting the most heinous of crimes, and regulating trade 
in and out of Micronesia. They also began enforcing a series of “Kidnapping Acts,” meant to 
deter the abduction of natives by European privateers.33 For the first time, Micronesia was 
entering into the international economic and legal system and getting a taste of the political 
significance it would come to have in the two centuries to come.   
 Increased European contact came with devastating waves of disease. Epidemics came and 
went as new vessels brought new ailments, particularly smallpox, measles, influenza, and 
syphilis. In Palau, the population plummeted from an estimated 10,000 in 1860 to 4,000 by 
1800.34 Likewise, the population of Pohnpei dropped from 10,000 to less than 5,000, the 
Marshalls’ from 15,000 to 10,000, and Kosrae from 3000 to only 300. Only isolated Chuuk and 
Yap were initially spared this scale of devastation from foreign disease.35 Even in Guam, with 
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centuries of outside contact, was not immune. In 1856, an outbreak of smallpox killed 60 percent 
of the island’s population.36 
 During this period, the Spanish were becoming decreasingly interested in their Mariana 
colonies. According to Fran Hezel, “Guam in the early 1800s was a sleep little colony of two or 
three thousand souls, a lonely outpost . . . there was no business or industry to speak of.”37 
Robert Rogers describes Guam during the “Twilight of the Pax Hispanica” as “distant”, “with 
little oversight”, needing only a “shove to break away from Madrid’s tired arms.”38 Spain, the 
titular colonial ruler of Micronesia, was extending little authority throughout the islands. By the 
latter half of the 1800s, Britian had declined to move to annex territory in Micronesia and the 
rapidly rising German Empire was moving in intent on conquest of the Caroline and Marshall 
islands for their new colonial empire. This foreign challenge at last roused the Spanish to make a 
more formal claim to the Carolines. Soon, Spanish and German ships were racing one another to 
the Caroline Islands, placing plaques and raising flags in order to legitimize their claims.  
 The race for the Carolines nearly caused a European War in 1885. Simultaneous with the 
Berlin Conference to divide Africa the same year (of which Spain received a mere pittance), 
there was deep insecurity in Spain about the nation’s status as a global power. When the 
Germans made their move in the islands, Spanish officials responded by igniting anti-German 
riots in Madrid, Valencia, and Barcelona.39 Frustrated, Otto von Bismarck remarked that, “[The 
Carolines] are not worth it. The islands would not repay one week of preparation for war.”40 The 
dispute was mediated by the Vatican in 1885, with the resolution that Spain would receive the 
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Carolines and Germany the Marshalls. Already in the 19
th
 century, the tiny islands of Micronesia 
had caused a major international crisis – a taste of the high-stakes global geopolitics that was 
creeping into the region.41  
Micronesia in the Age of Imperialism (1886-1917) 
 Now with a legitimate claim the Carolines but without any colonial infrastructure outside 
of the Marianas, Spain set out to finally conquer Southern Micronesia. Warships were dispatched 
to large islands such as Palau and Pohnpei to place plaques, raise flags, and reach pacts with 
local chiefs. Additionally, Spain did make a serious effort to settle the islands of Pohnpei and 
Yap in 1886 (where they built small colonial towns, both named “Kolonia”). However, Spanish 
government of the islands was quite weak, and traditional political systems mostly continued 
unmolested. Meanwhile, Germany was asserting more and more control of the Marshalls to the 
east, formally annexing the islands in 1885 and investing in the trade of copra.42 Any illusions 
that the Spanish would become a lasting force in the Carolines were crushed in 1898, with 
Madrid’s catastrophic defeat in the Spanish-American War. As a result, the ascendant United 
States had seized much of Spain’s Pacific Empire including Guam and the Philippines. However, 
the Americans declined to annex the remainder of Spanish Micronesia, including the Mariana 
Islands of which Guam had been linked culturally and economically for all of known history.  
 Crippled, Spain sold the remainder of the Carolines and Marianas to Germany in 1899. 
The ambitious Germans gained in reality the already-colonized Marianas – the rest had to be 
earned, and the Germans were much more proactive colonial masters. German administrators 
worked assiduously to reach pacts with local chiefs, establish settlements, and write laws. The 
lucrative smuggling of guns and liquor in the Carolines was banned, and German trading 
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companies began heavily regulating the copra trade.43 Their efforts were surprisingly effective, 
and by 1910 the Germans had made inroads into previously-hostile island groups such as Chuuk. 
Meanwhile, America had acquired its first Micronesian territory with the island of Guam 
and had little idea of what exactly to do with it. Legally, Guam’s territorial status was as an 
“unincorporated, unorganized” territory governed by the US Navy. The US Constitution was not 
extended to Guam, and instead the islands were governed under the Insular Cases, a set of 
Supreme Court cases from 1901 which affirmed the denial of constitutional rights to the 
inhabitants of US territories on the grounds that “alien races” may be not be able to accord 
themselves with “Anglo-Saxon principles.”44 The US Navy was thus free to run an inattentive 
colonial government and utilize Guam as a coaling and telegraph station. Guam historian Robert 
Rogers summarized post-annexation American governance on Guam as being conducted “as if it 
were a warship, the USS Guam, with the governor as captain, American military personnel as 
crew, and Chamorros as mess attendants.”45   
Meanwhile, the ambitious Japanese Empire searched for the opportunity in Spain’s 
eviction from Micronesia. Tokyo had just recently conquered Taiwan and had eyes on expansion 
into the region it knew as Nanʻyō – the “South Seas.” According to historian Mark R. Peattie, 
Nanʻyō was a topic of “fevered excitement” among the Japanese political class of the late 1800s, 
even becoming the subject of a widely popular genre of Japanese pulp novels in which heroic 
Japanese men went on expeditions to exotic and pristine Pacific Islands.46 To the North, Japan 
annexed the Bonin and Volcano islands (including Iwo Jima) – two chains north of the Marianas 
that were unclaimed and had no native populations. Slowly throughout the decade of the 1900s, 
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Japanese traders and fisherman began establishing operations in German Micronesia under the 
nose (and often against the wishes) of colonial administrators. In essence, just as the Germans 
were establishing themselves, a new great power had already set out to displace them in 
Micronesia. 
The outbreak of the Great War in 1914 provided Japan with its opportunity to expand 
into the South Seas. Bound by alliance to Great Britain, Japan declared war on Germany and 
invaded German Micronesia, competing with sailors from British Australia to quickly occupy the 
Kaiser’s most easterly colonies (the British would grab German New Guinea and the Gilbert 
Islands). Although Japan would sporadically participate in war efforts as an Allied Power until 
the end, the invasion of Micronesia was the single most significant Japanese military 
contribution to the Great War. In fact, the prospect of conquering Micronesia was a key motive 
for Japanese involvement in the war, and the lack of further Japanese military participation left 
other Allied powers deeply suspicious of Tokyo’s motives.47 
Japanese Rule in Micronesia (1914-1942) 
Japan’s invasion of Micronesia was a significant item of contention at the Versailles 
Treaty negotiations of 1919. The United States under President Woodrow Wilson (now with 
interests as far as Guam and the Philippines) in particular objected to Japanese expansionism, 
and the Americans made a concerted effort to force League of Nations oversight of the new 
Japanese territory of Nanʻyō. Instead of annexation, Japan was to consent to a “League Mandate” 
that placed Japan as the temporary guardian of the islands and required that certain minimum 
standards be met in the interests of the native population.  Like most other initiatives of the 
League of Nations, the Mandate system essentially failed in Micronesia, as the League had no 
enforcement capability, leaving a reality indistinguishable from annexation. The deal on the 
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Japanese side was highly favorable, as they were given nearly complete control of Micronesia in 
return for a simple verbal commitment by the Japanese delegation to return Shandong to China 
(which they did not).48 Congress, eager to pick at the Versailles treaty, pounced on Wilson for 
failing to secure a better deal in Micronesia, forcing the State Department to return and demand 
additional concessions from Tokyo – consisting of the rights to lay telegraph cable and trade in 
Yap, a privilege that the Japanese reluctantly granted but would never be invoked by the United 
States.49 For the second time, the United States had blundered and allowed Micronesia to fall into 
the hands of an aggressive foreign power.  
This exchange, made amidst the larger tradeoffs of the Versailles negotiations, left 
American naval planners deeply anxious about their newly exposed Pacific flank. In the event of 
war, Japan now had bases from which it could easily seize Guam and cut off American supply 
lines to the Philippines. The Navy and other branches began formulating “War Plan Orange”, the 
strategy for a potential Pacific War with Japan. Noting the gradual Japanese buildup in 
Micronesia, War Plan Orange no longer treated the Pacific islands as just fixed coaling and 
telegraph cable station but as logistical hubs from which the United States (or a hostile power) 
could deploy fleets and aircraft.50 In 1935, the Joint Army and Navy Board officially made the 
invasion of Japanese Micronesia central to the war plan – in the event of conflict, America would 
not attack Japan directly from the East from Hawai’i and North the Philippines (as previously 
planned), but up the Marshalls and into the Carolines to support an eventual blockade of Japan.51 
American planners were accepting that Guam and the Philippines were likely to be lost, and that 
an invasion of Japan would require stepping stones in the Pacific. Nevertheless, the United States 
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directly moved into the South Pacific with the secretive “American Equatorial Islands 
Colonization Project”, a federal program which recruited native Hawai’ians to establish 
permanent settlements on the eastern fringes of Japanese Micronesia. 
With the United States watching nervously from the sidelines, Japan pushed the limits of 
the League Mandate as far as possible. Initially, the people of Micronesia had little reason to fear 
that changing a Kaiser for an Emperor would substantially alter their day-to-day lives. To the 
contrary, the Japanese initiated a dramatic national effort to settle, exploit, and militarize its new 
territories in Nanʻyō. Overall, the Japanese Empire was profoundly more directly invested in 
Micronesia than either the Spanish or the Germans, and were far more willing and capable in 
upending the traditional political, economic, and cultural status quo of the islands. During the 
preceding two colonial periods, a small number of foreign administrators and traders “ruled” 
Micronesia mostly by making deals with local chiefs, facilitating exports, and maintaining small 
garrisons. Never was Micronesia truly colonized by thousands of foreign settlers until the 
Japanese Mandate.  
The physical evidence of Japanese rule came to be everywhere on the islands. Telegraph 
cable was laid, airports were built, and the relative independence of the Micronesian chiefs was 
ended under a stifling effort to institute comprehensive Japanese rule. Sleepy coaling stations 
were transformed into colonial cities populated by foreign colonists, jungles were paved over 
with massive sugar plantations, and foreign commercial fisherman flooded into the islands en 
masse. Micronesian natives found themselves third-class citizens – lower in status than both their 
Japanese masters and the waves of Okinawan and Korean immigrants who arrived under the 
Japanese to Micronesia to work in the new colonial economy. By the end of the 1930s, more 
ethnic Japanese resided in Nanʻyō than ethnic Micronesians, comprising 58 percent of the 
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population. On Saipan alone, there were only 3,000 native Chamorros compared with over 
20,000 Japanese in 1941.52 The scale and rapidity with which Japan was changing Micronesia 
cannot be understated. After just a couple of decades of Japanese administration, indigenous 
Micronesian culture was on the path to total extinction, and the islands were becoming political, 
economic, and cultural extensions of mainland Japan.  
On December 7, 1941 the Imperial Japanese Navy used Nanʻyō as a base of operations 
for the attack on Pearl Harbor. The same day, Japan seized Guam, with dozens of Chamorro 
translators in tow from Saipan. On the fringes of Micronesia, Japanese forces quickly invaded 
the British-held Gilbert Islands and forced the evacuation of the fledgling colonies set up by the 
American Equatorial Islands Colonization Project. With the premise of League oversight now 
completely removed, Japan’s colonial regime intensified even further. Thousands of 
Micronesians were enlisted into forced military labor, and many would be killed in the fighting 
that followed. Far from being a remote and neglected colony of the Spanish Empire, by 1941 
Micronesia was the contested middle ground between the United States and Japan in the largest 
amphibious conflict of human history.  
The Rising Sun Sets (1942-1945) 
 Once it became clear that Japan lacked the offense capability to follow-up on the strategic 
surprise delivered at Pearl Harbor, American strategy in the Pacific War organized itself around 
the idea of “island-hopping” across the Pacific – capturing select islands and using them to 
project power closer and closer to the Japanese home islands. This was a more strategically 
flexible version of the principles of War Plan Orange, which had called for an offensive 
campaign running up the Micronesian islands towards the Japanese mainland. The first major 
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American offensive in the South Pacific was launched in the Gilbert Islands (seized from Great 
Britain after Pearl Harbor) in late 1943, where Japanese positions were recently constructed and 
therefore thought to be more vulnerable. The battle of Tarawa was a taste of things to come – 
American Marines suffered 1,000 dead and 2,000 wounded storming the beaches of the small 
atoll.53 Although the Japanese had heavily fortified nearly every inch of land in the Marshall and 
Gilbert Islands and with mines, trenches, and bunkers, the American amphibious invasion was 
successful and soon not long after Tarawa several more Marshallese atolls had been taken from 
Japan.54 From this southern position, Admiral Chester Nimitz moved his forces north into the 
Marshalls, fighting amphibious battles to seize the well-fortified atolls of Majuro, Kwajalein, and 
Eniwetok. Kwajalein, the world’s largest atoll, was particularly important as the headquarters of 
the Japanese Fourth Fleet.55 With the success of the invasion, the Marshalls were the first pre-
War Japanese territory to be reclaimed by the Allied powers.  
Using the Marshalls as his new forward operating base, Nimitz launched an ambitious 
campaign to bypass the Carolines and go straight for the Mariana Islands, which could 
potentially be utilized to launch a strategic bombing campaign on the Japanese home islands. 
After several high casualty battles, by mid-1944 American forces had invaded the Mariana 
Islands and held Saipan, Guam, and Tinian. The Mariana airfields indeed proved to be of 
significant utility to the United States, and from there air power was used to obliterate the 
Japanese anchorage and fleet in Chuuk lagoon, permanently crippling Japan’s ability to project 
power into Micronesia.56 The Mariana Islands had been a major supply and communications hub 
for the Japanese and their loss presaged the larger defeat for Japan. “When we lost Saipan, Hell 
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is on us”, remarked Fleet Admiral Nagano, Supreme Naval Advisor the Emperor.57 Soon after a 
second attack was planned for Palau, the administrative center of the Japanese Mandate and 
home to over 25,000 Japanese troops. In November 1944, the United States invaded the island of 
Peleliu with the intention of using its airfield to retake the Philippines. The ensuing battle is 
known today as the fiercest amphibious combat of the Second World War and the last major 
engagement fought in Micronesia. Over the entire American campaign in Micronesia, some 
7,353 Americans were killed and 25,042 were wounded, higher than American casualties on D-
Day.58 The successful Micronesian campaigns allowed American forces to push further into Iwo 
Jima, the Philippines, and Okinawa. Furthermore, the airfields of the Mariana Islands were 
critical in the strategic bombing campaign that crippled Japan in 1945, and the planes that 
dropped the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki took off from Tinian.  
Having successfully invaded foreign territory, America had to determine how to 
administer the population of the islands. On September 17
th
, 1943 President Roosevelt stated to 
Congress that “the United Nations will never let [Japan] have authority over the islands which 
were mandated to her by the League of Nations.”59 The President’s priority was thus clear: the 
islands were to be governed by the United States. Anticipating victory, the Joint Chiefs crafted a 
comprehensive post-invasion plan for Naval government of the islands, and trained special 
officers on the culture and geography of Micronesia.60  
 Meanwhile, the islander experience of the war was one of helplessness and senselessness. 
Native Micronesians themselves had little idea of why the Japanese and Americans would fight 
with such tenacity for their remote atolls and islands. Isolated under blockades, the Japanese 
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occupiers began engaging in punitive beatings, rapes, and executions. Limited food and medicine 
were reserved for Japanese colonists rather than Micronesians, and desperate Japanese garrisons 
increasingly preyed on native populations as the war dragged on. Japanese occupation of many 
islands, bypassed or bombed over by the Americans, would only end with the Emperor’s 
surrender after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August of 1945, after which 
all of Micronesia fell into the hands of the United States. 
Micronesia’s Journey from Backwater to Battleground 
 By the 1940s, the remote islands of Micronesia fond themselves thrust into the middle of 
history’s largest conflict. The hardships of war were deeply unfair to the people of the islands, 
who had little to do with the affairs of the great powers. Undoubtedly, many wondered why such 
disaster had come to them. The answer is unfortunately quite simple: Micronesia happens to 
occupy a strategically important interior position of the Asia-Pacific. This mattered little in the 
age of Magellan, but as the nature and geopolitics and warfare changed dramatically in the 19
th
 
and 20
th
 century, Micronesia became gradually more relevant to other nations with interests in 
the Asia-Pacific. In general, foreign powers had not become interested in Micronesia because of 
what it was – there was little in Micronesia in the way of material wealth – but because of where 
it was. For the Spanish, Guam was an important stepping stone between its colonies in the 
Eastern and Western Hemispheres. For the British, Palau was a potential base for London’s 
merchant empire in the Pacific. For the Germans, who had no existing colonial empire, it was 
one of the last places on Earth that still seemed open for colonization. For the Japanese and later 
the Americans, Micronesia was the “strategic interior position” that could support, or at least 
defend, an empire across the Pacific.  
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Likewise, as the exposure to the wider world increased, the isolated islands of the 
Micronesia archipelago began to experience rapid social, political, and demographic change.  
Between the mid-1800s and 1945, British, Spanish, German, Japanese, and American interests 
had all variously predominated throughout the islands. Foreigners moved in, first the 
beachcombers, then the missionaries and traders, and finally the bureaucrats, soldiers, and 
laborers. Micronesia was portioned out by agreement of Spain and Germany after the diplomatic 
crisis of 1885, by Japan and the United States at Versailles in 1919, and then by the United States 
via United Nations in 1945. Nobody, it seemed, had thought to ask the islanders who they 
wanted to rule them, of if they desired to be ruled at all. It was question that even the Americans 
would take some time to grapple with.  
With little time to waste, the United States began searching for options to legitimizing its 
control of Micronesia. In 1946, the US Navy supported a bill in Congress to annex Micronesia, 
with Guam as the capital, putting Micronesia a path to statehood.61 However, as the United States 
set out to create a more peaceful world order through the United Nations, the optics of annexing 
occupied territory were perceived as damaging to America’s image abroad by the Truman 
Administration. Likewise, the USSR disputed America’s claim to Micronesia, forcing a deal in 
which the United States would not contest the Soviet annexation of four of the Kuril Islands 
north of Japan in exchange for Soviet acquiescence to a United Nations-sanctioned “American 
Strategic Trusteeship” for the South Pacific. Under this arrangement, the “Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands” (TTPI) was born. It was the only such “strategic” trusteeship that ever was 
created by the UN.  Throughout the process, no Micronesians were consulted on what political 
status they may have preferred for their own islands.  
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In 1947, US Secretary of State George Marshall presented the Trust Territory Agreement 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Congressional preferences had settled on 
maintaining control of Micronesia without annexation.62 The senators held a lengthy discussion 
on merits of trusteeship over sovereignty, the disadvantages of taking on a rapidly growing 
native population, and the overall strategic value of the territory. However, with memories of 
Pearl Harbor still fresh, the overwhelming priority was defensive. Nevertheless, they wondered 
aloud about the possible difficulties of administering such a territory: 
July 7, 1947 - Senate Foreign Relations Committee63 
 
Senator Hickenlooper The whole point of my question is, we look at the fine benefits 
which we get from security, but there are some human problems we are going to have to 
take on, and they will be sizable 20 years from now. 
 
Secretary Marshall The human problem and the question of the rights of the individual 
there, in their adaption to their tribal customs and matters of that sort, we will have a very 
practical problem there. 
 
The Chairman Anything else, Senator? 
 
Senator Hickenlooper No. 
 
The Chairman Senator Lodge? 
 
Senator Lodge Do you not feel that, as a matter of fact, the natives will be better off 
under us than they were before, taking it all in all? 
 
Secretary Marshall Yes, sir; if we do not try to change them too much. 
 
Senator Lodge Yes. I think they will be immeasurably better off under us. 
 
The Chairman If there is nothing more, Mr. Secretary, thank you very much. We will go 
down through the panel and see if we can discover anything wrong. 
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III. The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
“It is possible that the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, as a political entity, is ungovernable” 
-Ruth Van Cleve64 
“Our fathers who art in Washington, hallowed be thy funds 
Thy authorization come, thy appropriations be done” 
-Micronesian Senator John Mangefel65 
 The two decades following the end of the Second World War was a time of dramatic 
political reorganization throughout the Asia-Pacific. Japan was transformed into an American-
aligned democracy. The Chinese Civil War was resolved, with the Communists triumphant and 
the Nationalists sent fleeing to Taipei. Great Britain began withdrawing from its largest colonies, 
while local nationalists were pushing the French out of Indochina. Across the broader region, the 
United States and the Soviet Union were ascendant, with highly divergent priorities and interests. 
This chapter deals with the “Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands”, the American administration 
of Micronesia after the Second World War.  
 During the early years of the Trust Territory era the islands were changed immensely: the 
Japanese population was repatriated, Americans were now in charge, and nuclear weapons were 
tested at in the Marshalls. Created through the UN, the TTPI was an American invention with 
only token international oversight. It would take some time, and years of inadequate American 
administration, for the Micronesian population to become politically energized on the question of 
their political status.  The arduous negotiations between Micronesians and Americans that 
followed produced the Micronesia of today: independent nations in “Compacts of Free 
Association” with the United States.   
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Naval Administration (1943-1950)  
 Of the 11 Trusteeships designated worldwide by the United Nations, the TTPI was the 
only “strategic trust” – giving the territory a unique exemption from international oversight. 
Immediately after the War, the Truman Administration continued to have the US Navy govern 
the TTPI, with the islands closed to the outside world. The so-called “zoo policy” ( in reality 
military rule) permitted the Micronesians to maintain their traditional lifestyles but established 
the principle that all policy decisions would be made on the basis of the security interests of the 
United States.66 For the Navy, the most immediate issue was the distribution of food and 
medicine to the islanders, who had been deprived of basic necessities during wartime. The more 
ambitious project of the Micronesia’s Navy government was the undoing of the entire Japanese 
colonial project in Micronesia.  
Soon after the Japan’s surrender, the Navy ordered all Japanese colonists and soldiers to 
be repatriated to their homeland. By 1945, including civilian and military personnel, there were 
about 147,000 East Asians in Micronesia – including not only the Japanese but their Korean, 
Okinawan, and Taiwanese subjects.67 The undertaking was formidable; requiring what remained 
of the Japanese government to assemble some of the remains of their decimated navy to facilitate 
the population transfer. Few Japanese, even those with Micronesian wives and long histories on 
the islands, were permitted to remain in their former colonies. Throughout the islands, the 
massive Japanese sugar cane plantations were planted over with soil-binding reeds, and Japanese 
language and religion were removed from public life – to little resistance from the locals, who 
returned to using their local languages. Within a couple of years, the Japanese dream of Nanʻyō 
was no more. 
                                                          
66
 Rogers, Destiny’s Landfall: A History of Guam. 193 
67
 Peattie, Nanʻyō. 308 
Andrews 38 
 
The mass deportations meant that native Micronesians were once again the majority on 
their own islands. No longer were islanders “third-class” citizens behind the Koreans and 
Okinawans – the thousands of foreign people of alien races who had displaced them were nearly 
all gone. The Americans who now ruled Micronesia through the TTPI did not bring with them a 
settler population of ethnic Americans to displace the islanders. Instead, the Naval administration 
was light-handed, at first distributing aid and leaving civil administration in the hands of the 
local chiefs who had held sway since before the Japanese occupation.  
Not all was well with the new regime. With the Japanese colonial economy gone, 
Micronesian living standards dropped precipitously; incomes in Yap, for example, dropped from 
$26 to $16, and incomes in Palau from $44 to $14.68 Recognizing the economic problem that had 
resulted from the expulsion of the Asian population, the Navy began to attempt a handful of 
economic development initiatives and tried to build an export economy. None (phosphate, copra, 
scrap metal) were particularly successful. Various other efforts, such as the redistribution of land 
confiscated by the Japanese, were more successful, but still did not produce economic growth, as 
the islands were remained closed to commerce under the zoo policy.  
In 1947, the Navy held the first municipal elections across the Trust Territory. In all 
districts except for Palau, the traditional chiefs were returned into positions of authority from 
which the Japanese had removed them. Initially, there was little outward Micronesian enthusiasm 
for democracy, and a strong desire to return to the pre-Japanese structures of political authority.69 
Incumbent Japanese-appointed chiefs on Yap were replaced with the older hereditary chiefs. The 
unpopular Japanese-aligned King of Kosrae was ousted and replaced with his more charismatic 
son. The exception (Palau) is important, as two members of the Japanese-educated elite ousted 
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the traditional chiefs on a pro-modernization platform. The municipal elections of 1947 were by 
no means a soaring exercise in western-style liberal democracy; however they did provide the 
islanders with some degree of empowerment. Following up, the Navy began planning for state-
level elections, and competing pro-traditionalism and pro-modernization political coalitions 
began emerging on islands like Pohnpei.  
The Naval administration of Micronesia was both competent and highly ethically 
questionable.  Retired Admiral Carlton Wright expressed the Navy’s governing philosophy as 
“the best thing we could do . . . is to let them completely alone.”70 As such, the nature of the 
early TTPI civil administration more resembled that of the distant, half-interested Spanish 
Empire than of the militant colonizing Japanese. For the United States, the strategic priorities of 
the early Cold War in Asia were in places like Japan, China, Korea, and Vietnam. Micronesia’s 
utility lay in its occupation of the strategic space between North America and these critical Asian 
nations. Philip Manhard, US Ambassador to the Trust Territory, affirmed that the overarching 
American priority during the early-TTPI was strategic – intended to prevent the use of the region 
by an outside power: “During the first 15 years of its administration, the United States took its 
security and defense interests and its military prerogatives very seriously, and its political, social, 
and economic responsibilities relatively lightly.”71   
The 1950s: Reform in Guam and Interior in Micronesia 
 The creation of the TTPI brought new attention to the status of America’s Micronesian 
territory of Guam, which had been reclaimed from Japan in 1944. Under the Insular Cases of 
1901, Guam had been effectively ignored by Congress and its inhabitants were not American 
citizens. Subsequently, the bloody battle to liberate Guam convinced many of the strategic 
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importance of the island, especially as it emerged as a central logistical hub for America’s 
enhanced presence in the Asia-Pacific during the Cold War. Meanwhile, among the Chamorros 
the desire for US citizenship was the “one issue” of political consensus among an otherwise 
divided polity.72 Congress addressed the issue in 1950 with the Organic Act of Guam, which 
extended US citizenship to the Guamanians and allowed for local self-government. However, the 
Insular Cases remained in legal effect and Guam was not given the possibility of of statehood – 
its status simply changed from “unorganized” to “organized” while still an “unincorporated 
territory.”  
 Also in 1950, the White House transferred control of the TTPI from the Navy to the 
Department of the Interior, ending military government on the islands. The transition was rocky, 
as Interior had never before been asked to manage such a distant, large, and geographically 
difficult territory.73 The Department kept many of the programs initiated by the Navy, and 
operated under a tight budget, leaving public services stretched extremely thin. Primary schools 
were opened with the goal of providing universal education but were staffed with untrained local 
teachers, and there were only two American doctors for the entirety of the TTPI. Interior policy 
was to hire Micronesians over Americans wherever possible, a policy was both detrimental to the 
immediate governance of the islands, but planted the seeds of the English-speaking professional 
class that would eventually evolve into Micronesia’s next generation of political leaders.74 Small 
programs to develop export industries and build infrastructure were also carried over through the 
transition, and Interior continued work towards democratization, creating district-wide elected 
governments above the municipal level. In 1956, the TTPI convened the first Micronesia-wide 
advisory body of elected local leaders – what would later become the Congress of Micronesia.  
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 As the TTPI reformed, the Mariana Islands remained heavily militarized. Saipan was 
isolated completely from the outside world, as the newly-created CIA used the island to train an 
army of Chinese Nationalists to overthrow the upstart Communist government in Beijing. For 
several years, the Navy and CIA retained control of Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, using them for 
military and intelligence purposes.75 Interior, which had sought to make Saipan the capital of the 
TTPI, was forced instead to govern the islands temporarily from distant Honolulu.  
 
Figure 2: An American Map of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands including the 7 Trust Territory 
Districts and Guam in the center. Note the size comparison between the TTPI and the continental United 
States on the top-left. 
76
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Nuclear Testing in the Marshalls 
 In February of 1946, Ben Wyatt, Military Governor of the Marshall Islands, arrived at 
Bikini Atoll via seaplane. Meeting the island’s entire population of 167 after church services, he 
asked the islanders if they would be willing to sacrifice their islands for the sake of world peace, 
“for the good of mankind and to end all world wars.”77 Wyatt essentially told the people of 
Bikini Atoll that they were being compelled to relocate, as the United States needed a new 
proving ground for its nuclear technology. Without any option to dissent, the group’s chief 
acquiesced and told his people that they were moving to the nearby atoll of Rongerik. Just a few 
decades before, the Marshall Islands were the edge of the world visited only by missionaries and 
a handful of German copra traders. Now after surviving the hardships of the Pacific War, Chief 
Juda of Bikini was being told to move his entire tribe so that the most powerful weapons in 
history could be tested on his home. In July, the first two atomic bombs were detonated at Bikini, 
one in the air and another underwater. Fran Hezel sums up the subsequent period of nuclear 
testing in the Marshalls as thus:  
Between 1946 and the last test in 1958, 66 atomic and hydrogen bombs were 
detonated in the Marshalls, obliterating six islets and rendering many others 
uninhabitable because of the high radiation levels. The most damaging, in human 
terms as well as ecological, was the famous Bravo shot in March 1954, when a 
15-megaton hydrogen bomb, a thousand times the size of the Hiroshima weapon, 
was exploded over Bikini78 
 At the time, the effects of nuclear radiation were little understood. Soon the people of 
nearby atolls would experience unusual burns, miscarriages, birth defects, and increased 
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incidences of cancer. The radiation from testing on Eniwetok and Bikini was carried east by the 
trade winds, and hit the relocated Bikinians on Rongerik as well as other Marshallese, and over a 
dozen unlucky Japanese fishermen. In 1954, the Marshall Islands sent a delegate to the 
Trusteeship Council to formally protest nuclear testing for the first time.79 The effects of nuclear 
testing on the Marshallese are contentious and are being litigated even to this day. Since 1956, 
the US has paid out compensation to affected islanders, but the eligibility pool and amount of 
compensation given have been hotly disputed. The exact number of cases of cancer and birth 
defects that can be directly attributed to nuclear testing is unknown, but is thought to be in the 
hundreds. Strikingly, the nuclear testing of the 1950s and 1960s marks the second time 
Micronesia became a major setting in the history of nuclear weapons – having first been the 
place from which the Enola Gay launched from Tinian to bomb Hiroshima.  
Kennedy and Johnson Change Course (1961-1969) 
As the Second World War was fading from the common consciousness in the 1960s, the 
UN Trusteeship Council and major American media outlets became more critical towards the 
TTPI, and a consensus emerged that America was mismanaging the “Rust Territory.” As a 
condition of Trusteeship, the UN had been dispatching regular missions to Micronesia which 
frequently concluded that the United States was not fulfilling its commitments to adequately 
feed, educate, and politically develop the Micronesian population. Internally, the State 
Department shared these concerns. A devastating polio epidemic in 1958 on Ebeye in the 
Marshalls brought particular attention to the TTPI’s deficiencies.  
These issues landed directly on the desk of President John F Kennedy, who was 
personally outraged and initiated substantial reforms to the TTPI. First, the zoo policy was 
terminated, allowing outsiders, tourists, and businessmen to come and go from Micronesia. The 
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CIA and Navy were compelled to surrender the Mariana Islands to Interior, which promptly 
moved the TTPI’s capital from Honolulu to Saipan. The annual budget for the TTPI was doubled 
from $7.5 million to 15 million. Kennedy also commissioned the formulation of a 
comprehensive Micronesia strategy by Harvard economist Anthony Solomon, who 
recommended that a plebiscite be held in 1968 in which the TTPI would be pushed to ratify 
permanent political association with the United States.80 Unfortunately, the Solomon report was 
essentially lost in the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, and subsequent US Presidents 
were not as personally attentive to the Micronesian issue. However, Kennedy did succeed in 
setting the immediate agenda under the principle that the US should develop the TTPI politically 
and economically while working towards a sustainable political status to be ratified via 
plebiscite. As a whole, the Kennedy administration was the first to seriously attempt to rectify 
American values with American strategic interests on the question of Micronesia.  
Kennedy also began a program that would become integral in Micronesia’s political 
development: the Peace Corps. By 1968 there were 940 Peace Corps volunteers serving in 
Micronesia (1 for every 100 Micronesians), forming the largest per capita Peace Corps presence 
in the entire world. The Peace Corps would become a major political and cultural force across 
the islands, intermingling with the locals and settling into a distinct social and political role just 
as the beachcombers and missionaries of the 1800s once had.81 In the coming years, Peace Corps 
volunteers would become some of the strongest advocates for Micronesian independence.  
Given these massive new investments in economic development, democratization, and 
education, the US was drifting significantly from Secretary George Marshall’s recommendation 
that “we do not try to change them too much” and the Navy’s policy of non-interference. The 
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new Kennedy agenda did not prioritize preserving the “traditional” Micronesia, but instead 
sought to build a new, modern, and Americanized Micronesia that would serve the long-term 
strategic interests of the United States. 
 Throughout this period, key geographic divisions began to surface within the Trust 
Territory. The primary fissures were between the Chamorros of the Mariana Islands, who 
favored political union with the Guam, and the rest of the Micronesians. Given the Marianas’ 
unique colonial history and Chamorro heritage, the islanders of Saipan and Tinian were 
becoming less enthusiastic about the project of Micronesian unity, and instead requested to 
merge with Guam as a US territory. In a series of four non-binding polls from 1958 to 1969, a 
strong majority of Mariana Islanders voted for political union with Guam. Guam, however, 
refused Saipan requests, holding their own plebiscite in 1969 with 58 percent voting against the 
reunification of the Mariana Islands. Enmity from WW2, in which many Saipanese interpreters 
had served the brutal Japanese occupiers, and concern that Guam’s booming economy would be 
dragged down by the poorer Marianas, were the driving forces behind Guam’s refusal.82 Guam’s 
rejection, however, simply encouraged the Saipan delegation to seek out other avenues towards 
political union with the United States. Unity was fraying elsewhere as well as Micronesian 
politics became more active. To the west, Palau’s increasingly volatile and radical politics were 
off-putting to the other Micronesians, while to east the Marshallese began (albeit more modestly) 
to assert their own, unique Marshallese identity.  
 In 1963 the Micronesian "Inter-District Advisory Committee," a board meant to advise 
the TTPI government, declared the formation of “Council of Micronesia.” The next year, the 
body was formally constituted as the elected “Congress of Micronesia,” to meet regularly on 
Saipan. The regular meetings of the Congress consumed Micronesian political energy for the 
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next few years, as the Congress began to assume jurisdiction over areas previously left to the 
TTPI administration. After the formation of the Congress, the day-to-day governance of the 
islands was increasingly a Micronesian responsibility.  
 By the end of the Kennedy administration, Interior had established a clear policy agenda 
for Micronesia: begin with a massive development and education program, move the islands 
towards self-governance, and eventually find a long-lasting political arrangement that would 
leave the islands affiliated with the United States. But fissures among the federal agencies were 
already undermining Interior’s plan. Doves at the State Department favored independence for the 
islands as part of a unified Micronesian Federation affiliated with the United States, while more 
expansionist factions at Defense and Interior pushed to incorporate the TTPI as a Territory or 
Commonwealth. Interior generally favored Commonwealth, although opinions within the 
Department itself. All of these options were on the table as negotiations began in earnest in 1963. 
Yet the clearly inconsistent positions of the federal agencies left no clear American position for 
the Micronesians to work with.   
 By early 1964, the new Johnson Administration seems to have misplaced or ignored the 
Kennedy-commissioned Solomon Report on Micronesian political status, and did not craft a 
comprehensive strategy of their own. Lacking guidance from Washington, the Congress of 
Micronesia created the Micronesian Future Political Status Commission to study their options, 
which they narrowed to four: independence, free association or protectorate status, 
commonwealth or territory within the United States, or continuation as a Trust Territory.83 Full 
independence was not included. As the Congress of Micronesia began consolidating around a 
negotiating position, the American foreign policy bureaucracy never arrived at a coherent inter-
agency solution.   
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 Meanwhile, the Micronesian population boomed. In 1955, TTPI administrators estimated 
that there were 63,992 residents in the Trust Territory. By the 1973 census, administrators were 
counting 115,251. Guam’s population also increased markedly, from around 59,000 in 1950 to 
over 102,000 by 1980. These population explosions were not permanent – and in fact the islands 
would stop growing in the 1980s and 1990s – but they created an increasing burden on the 
shoestring TTPI administration. Islanders were also increasingly conscious of the significant 
population increases – which if continued indefinitely could damage traditional Micronesian 
systems of communal land ownership. That Micronesia was becoming increasingly crowded 
helps explain, to some extent, the wave of mass migration to the United States that we will see 
during the Compact period.  
Negotiations and the Breakup of the TTPI (1969-1979) 
 The Nixon Administration proved even more inept on the issue of Micronesian political 
status. In 1969, President Nixon brusquely ordered his Interior Secretary to annex Micronesia, 
with the same unincorporated status as Guam. The decision was divorced from both the evolving 
preferences of the Congress of Micronesia and the US Government Agencies who had worked 
on the issue for many years, and sparked outrage and confusion among both camps. By the end 
of the year, Micronesia and the United States had each set up working groups to come to a 
compromise. Unfortunately, the Nixon administration remained inflexible and disinterested in 
the particulars of Micronesian political status. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, 
apparently bored by the topic of the islanders' political preferences, remarked “There are only 
90,000 people out there. Who gives a damn?”84 
 By 1970, the increasingly frustrated Micronesian negotiators wrote up four bedrock 
demands for resolving the status question: sovereignty, self-government, a constitution, and 
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revocable Compact of Free Association. The Compact of Free Association, to be discussed in 
depth in the next chapter, was the proposal that a treaty agreement be reached between the 
United States and an independent and constitutionally-governed Micronesia nation, allowing the 
United States strategic control of the region while also allowing the islanders nearly-complete 
self-government. In response, the American negotiators (under the instructions of Kissinger) 
returned with an offer of Commonwealth status not substantially different from the earlier 
proposal of annexation.   
 Meanwhile, the frustration of the Mariana islanders finally boiled over, and by 1972 the 
Mariana delegation began separate negotiations with the United States, intending to accept the 
offer of Commonwealth status. The State Department was highly reluctant to allow the splitting 
of the TTPI, but the Nixon administration seemed satisfied with the prospect of getting at least 
one of the TTPI districts to accept. By 1975, the Mariana Islanders had officially struck a deal to 
join the United States as the “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands.” With the 
Mariana delegation fully out and Jimmy Carter now President of the United States, the exhausted 
American negotiators conceded to all four bedrock demands of the Congress of Micronesia, and 
they were put together into a Constitution to be approved by a plebiscite in July 1978 (Note: The 
Constitution is now known as the “Constitution of 1979”, based on its effective date). The rest of 
Micronesia, it seems, was on the path to independence with free association.  
 On election day, Yap voted 94.8% in favor, Chuuk 69.5% in favor, Pohnpei 74.7% in 
favor, Kosrae 61% in favor; while Palau rejected with 55.1% opposed, as did the Marshalls with 
61.5% opposed.85 Turnout was above 70% in all 6 districts. Yap, Chuuk, Pohnpei, and Kosrae 
were thereafter the “Federated States of Micronesia.” The State Department dream of a 
Micronesian federation had been realized, but without Palau and the Marshalls. The Marshalls, 
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simply wanting a state for their own people, were now constituted as the “Republic of the 
Marshall Islands” and put on the same timetable towards independence as the newly-created 
FSM. Meanwhile, Palau’s rejection of the Constitution seems to have surprised even the Palauan 
delegation, and their path to independence would drag on far longer.  
Independence and Post-Independence (1979-Present) 
The newly formed Federated States of Micronesia and Republic of the Marshall Islands 
had finally resolved the question of their political status.  In 1986, both the Marshall Islands and 
the Federated States of Micronesia gained formal independence.  Palau, meanwhile, was looking 
more and more like a political basketcase. Although it had a domestic government, it remained 
technically in the TTPI. The island’s first president was assassinated, and Palau’s second 
president, the charismatic Micronesian icon Lazarus Sallii, committed suicide on the job. To save 
face after the surprise rejection of the Constitution of 1979, the Palauan delegation conjured up 
additional concessions from the United States that would forbid nuclear-powered ships from 
docking on Palau and expand Palau’s EEZ. What followed were excruciating and lengthy 
negotiations on how to reach an acceptable Compact. Palau’s own domestically-drafted 
constitution required a 75% affirmative vote via plebiscite for ratification of the Compacts. In 
various iterations, the Compact was put to vote five times and never reached the 75% threshold, 
coming as high at 73%. After a few more American concessions in 1993, Palau finally 
reinterpreted its constitution to require only a majority vote for ratification and approved the 
Compact in 1994 with 68% of Palauans voting in favor.86 It was the sixth plebiscite held on the 
Compact in Palau. Upon independence in 1994, Palau was the last vestige of the TTPI to be 
granted independence. In fact, it was the last United Nations Trust Territory on the planet. 
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 With the political status question finally resolved, life and politics continued across the 
islands of the new Micronesian nations. In 1997, the Asian financial crisis hit the region. The 
recession was weathered relatively well in Guam and the Mariana Islands, manifesting only as a 
temporary drop in tourism and real estate investment – perhaps reflecting that political union 
with the United States was in fact offering economic security. In Saipan, an influx of foreign 
direct investment and immigration was beginning a period of growth that would significantly 
enrich the Northern Marianas. However, the crisis hit the newly-independent Compact countries 
hard. FSM’s government could not finance its debts and required an international bailout. 
Subsequent Asian Development Bank-imposed economic reforms failed to create lasting 
economic growth. In FSM and RMI especially, the crisis dimmed hopes that the island nations 
could create true, self-sustaining economies. No significant export industries could feasibly be 
developed that would provide high standards of living to the majority of the population – as no 
resource, be it copra, taro, or fisheries could ever be feasibly mass exported from Micronesia. 
Tourism, the great white whale of Micronesian economic policy, took off in Palau but never in 
the more distant FSM and RMI, where it has been stagnant since independence. The failure of 
the RMI and FSM economies, which today are almost entirely financed by foreign aid from the 
United States, is a continuing policy reality for Micronesia. There are few serious and feasible 
proposals to fix it. As such, living standards on FSM and RMI have not improved significantly 
since independence. Instead, a significant number of Micronesians – perhaps as high as one in 
the in FSM – have moved to the United States under the migration provisions of the Compacts. 
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Country/Territory Population GDP Per Capita US Annual Assistance (FY 2012)* 
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) 104,719 $3,000 $100,000,000 
Republic of the Marshall Islands 
(RMI) 
73,376 $3,200 $70,000,000 
Republic of Palau 21,347  $15,100 $13,200,000 
Guam 162,742 $30,500 (Territory)  
Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands (CNMI) 
53,467 $13,300 (Territory) 
Table 1: Sourced from the CIA World Factbook and USAID with most recent information. When combined, the 
population of American-controlled Micronesia is just 415,651, less than that of any American state. 
 
Reflecting on Micronesia’s Path to Independence  
 The question of Micronesian political status was finally resolved by the end of the 
century. Due to deficiencies in American leadership, the process took far longer than necessary. 
During the Kennedy and Johnson years, the consensus emerged that Micronesia should be made 
to voluntarily accept permanent union with the United States.87 Such an arrangement would be 
highly strategically beneficial to the US, and possibly economically beneficial to the 
Micronesians. But the lack of inter-agency consensus and focus from the Americans, and the 
subtle racism and condescending posture of the American delegation, led to less than optimal 
outcome in the Compacts of Free Association. 
 The lack of inter-agency focus within the US government was clear enough to all sides. 
According to Donald McHenry, “Resolution of Micronesia’s status was needlessly delayed by 
the failure of the executive branch to reconcile conflicts between Interior, State, and Defense.”88 
Likewise, according to Ruth Van Cleve of the Department of the Interior, “Micronesia has no 
constituency and each Secretary has bigger fish to fry. Washington has no agreed policy with 
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respect to Micronesia.”89 For the Americans, the desire for permanent strategic control was the 
only consistent position among all stakeholders. How to achieve this, and what would be the 
ethical or rational way of doing so, only engendered endless debate and little progress among the 
Americans. 
 Amidst their internal disagreements, the subtly racist attitude of the American negotiators 
further hampered the process. Of all the memoirs and books written of the American perspective 
throughout the negotiations, none face up to the reality that the Micronesians were never treated 
as equals. Briefly in 1947 the Navy had pushed for a path for Micronesian citizenship and 
statehood.90 With the slightest bit of resistance in the Senate, the proposal was squashed. Guam 
received US citizenship in 1950, but not the full constitutional rights that would come with 
statehood. The Northern Mariana Islands became an American Commonwealth with citizenship, 
but still far from the sort of true self-determination that the remainder of the Micronesians were 
hoping to achieve. As such, there was never again an offer of full citizenship with the rights of 
statehood. It would not have been infeasible – Hawai’i, a majority non-white Pacific island 
territory, was granted statehood in 1949. Micronesia, combined in all the TTPI districts plus 
Guam, would have had a population approximate with that of Wyoming, the smallest American 
state. There is little question that the Micronesians would have at the very least seriously 
considered, if not embraced, such an offer. Instead, they were treated to endlessly frustrating and 
insulting offers of annexation or neo-colonial “Commonwealth” status. Micronesian 
Congressman Lazarus Sallii was not shy in his observations of the dynamic, speaking of one of 
the United States’ latest offers of Commonwealth status: “Micronesians would become the 
newest, the smallest, the remotest non-white minority in the United States political family–as 
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permanent and as American, shall we say, as the American Indian.” 91 Among the American-
educated Micronesian political class of the 1960s and 1970s, this racial dynamic was widely 
noticed, and it poisoned the negotiations. The eventual solution of a Compact of Free 
Association was supposed to be a final compromise – the best of both worlds. Instead, as we will 
see in the subsequent chapter, it has been far from a perfect solution. 
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IV: Free Association and American Geopolitics 
 “There are only 90,000 people out there.  
Who gives a damn?” 
Henry Kissinger92 
“We have the trust, the United States has the territory” 
Micronesian Senator Ataji Balos93 
The Compacts of Free Association are a three-legged stool: self-determination, economic 
assistance, and security. Although the Compacts of Palau, FSM, and RMI differ slightly, they all 
essentially provide for the same deal – in essence, the Compact countries cede strategic control 
of their territory for a highly privileged relationship with the United States. This sort of political 
relationship is unique to Micronesia. Two Polynesian entities, the Cook Islands and Niue, are 
freely associated with New Zealand but are not UN member states. During the era of 
decolonization, other islands and territories around the world were placed into temporary free 
association status in the transition to independence. Micronesia is the only instance in which, for 
strategic reasons, such a relationship has been built to be permanent.  
Principle 1: Self-Determination 
 First and foremost, Title I of the Compacts guarantees the independence and sovereignty 
of the islands. The three Compact countries are traditional nation-states in most respects. They 
are able to sign treaties, join international organizations, and conduct basic foreign affairs 
without the interference of the United States. The Compact countries are not subject to the same 
customs and trade laws as the US mainland. Since independence, the United States has not 
traditionally meddled in the domestic politics of the islands and there is little reason to doubt the 
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authenticity of the guarantee of self-determination granted by the Compacts. Thus, with 
important exceptions, the Compacts emphasize the requirement of “mutual agreement” between 
the two entities regarding changes in policy. Importantly, either side is able to revoke the 
Compact unilaterally. This concession was hard-won by the Micronesian negotiators, who saw 
the ability to leave voluntarily as essential to their independence.   
Principle 2: Economic Aid 
 Title II of the Compacts mandate that the United States provide substantial economic aid 
to the partner countries. The first round of Compacts included gradually decreasing annual lump 
sum payments to both FSM and RMI, to expire in 2003. After the Asian Financial Crisis and the 
continuing stagnation of both RMI and FSM’s economies, the renewal of the financial portions 
of FSM/RMI Compacts in 2003 included further economic aid and the creation of a Compact 
Trust Fund – intended to act as a sort of sovereign wealth fund that would provide permanent 
assistance to the Compact nations without the need for continuing congressional approval. 
However, the Compact Trust Fund has significantly underperformed since 2003 (and especially 
given the impact of the 2008 Financial Crisis). Thus when the economic provisions of the 
RMI/FSM Compacts come up for renegotiation in 2023, it is expected that both nations will 
continue to request lump sum aid payments.   
 Palau’s Compact was structured differently given the longer and much more complex 
path it took to ratification. Like the RMI/FSM Compacts, Palau’s Compact can be terminated 
unilaterally by either side but does not build into place deadlines for the expiration of economic 
aid. Instead, Palau’s Compact requires 15, 30, and 40-year policy reviews by the State 
Department. The conclusions of the 15-year review, completed in 2011, have been stalled in 
congress for the past 6 years, despite the efforts of Senator John McCain and many federal 
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agencies during the Obama administration to pass it. The 15-year review itself called for an 
increase in direct aid and a shoring up of the Compact Trust Fund, which was met with 
skepticism in Congress. Recently, there have efforts to get the 15-year review moving forward 
attached to a larger defense bill.94  
 Nevertheless, the United States continues to highly subsidize the governments of the 
Compact States in other ways. Most remarkably, Compact countries use the United States dollar 
as their official currencies. In addition, USAID, the State Department, the Department of the 
Interior, and the Peace Corps are constantly engaged on the ground assisting with development 
projects that are not explicitly part of the Compact economic aid regime. Federal agencies such 
as the USDA, FAA, USPS, and FDIC all operate and provide services in the Freely Associated 
States. Furthermore, Compact citizens remain eligible for certain benefits including Pell Grants, 
though they were stripped of access to traditional American welfare programs (TANF, Medicaid, 
etc.) in the welfare reforms of the 1990s. Overall, American aid to the Compact states is the most 
significant and costly foreign assistance regime that the United States manages in Oceania 
(though one must note it is dwarfed by the foreign aid that the United States provides nations 
such as Israel and Egypt).  
 Furthermore, Compact citizens have the unrestricted right to live and work in the United 
States (and likewise, Americans can live and work in the Compact states without a visa). As 
discussed briefly at the end of Chapter I, under these privileges tens of thousands of 
Micronesians have moved to the US. Most numerous are the Micronesian communities in Guam, 
Hawai’i, and Saipan. However, increasing numbers are moving to the continental United States, 
where Micronesian migrants are less likely to face prejudice and have better job prospects. 
According to a 2012 study by Rev. Fran Hezel and Dr. Michael J Levin, the FSM population of 
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the United States totals 49,840 – including 16,790 born in the United States.95 If accurate, this 
implies that approximately one in three FSM Micronesians live in the United States, one of the 
highest rates of per capita migration to the United States from any nation worldwide. Although a 
similar census has not been conducted for the Marshallese, it is widely believed among 
Micronesia experts that immigration into the United States from the Marshall Islands may be of a 
similar scale. Many migrants are remaining in the United States and keeping American 
citizenship or dual citizenship if possible (as FSM, unlike RMI, prohibits dual citizenship). 
However, given the relatively small populations of the Compact countries, it is highly difficult to 
count Compact migrants.   
Principle 3: Security and Defense 
 Most critically for the United States, Title III of the Compacts state that the United States 
has "full authority and responsibility for security and defense matters" in the Compact states as 
well as strategic access to Micronesian territory and waters. The US is also able to seize 
Micronesian territory in a crisis, should WW2-era airfields and anchorages be required in a 
hypothetical military conflict. American spies are free to operate across Micronesia, and no 
doubt are keeping track of the increasing numbers of Chinese visitors.  
Compact countries do not have their own militaries. Instead, their citizens are eligible to 
serve in the Armed Forces of the United States. US military recruiters operate across the 
Compact states, and rate of service in the United States Armed Forces have been high among 
Micronesians. It is widely thought that the lack of economic opportunity in Micronesia has 
created a strong incentive to serve. However, Micronesians who have served also hold a deep 
sense of pride in their service. Remarkably, FSM sends more per capita recruits into the US 
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military than any American state.
96
 Casualty rates for Micronesians are also extremely high, with 
nine Micronesian soldiers KIA in Iraq and Afghanistan. In an era of historically low military 
service, the non-US citizens of Micronesia have acted as some of America’s most valiant and 
patriotic soldiers. On Pohnpei, one can see American flags draped from Micronesian homes and 
USARMY bumper stickers adorning local cars. Even in prosperous Guam service rates are high. 
Take this excerpt from an article on Micronesian military service: 
“They have a sense of patriotism that most people just don't understand," is the way 
Retired Army Major Edward Camacho explains it. How else can you account for the fact 
that the Northern Marianas now has about 250 men and women serving in Iraq, with 
hundreds of others posted elsewhere? Young people join the Armed Services, in 
Camacho's opinion, "because they see for themselves that in the long run it will allow 
their loved ones to enjoy freedom and prosperity and happiness." David Cohen, head of 
the Office of Insular Affairs, agrees: "There is a strong sense of patriotism throughout 
the US territories." Indeed, yellow ribbon decals and stickers carrying the message 
"Support our troops" can be seen everywhere on Saipan and Guam.
97
 
Overall it seems that Micronesians, both the American citizens of Guam and the CNMI 
and the Compact citizens of Palau, FSM, and RMI, are deeply proud of their connection to the 
US military and unusually willing to serve.  
 In addition, there is a substantial American physical military presence across Micronesia. 
The United States maintains an active military installation at Kwajalein Atoll, the Ronald Reagan 
Ballistic Missile Defense Test Site, which is used to test missile defense technologies as well as 
housing a spaceport for near-equatorial satellite launches. Guam is home to Naval Base Guam 
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and Anderson Air Force Base, two gigantic military installations that serve as a major logistical 
hub for American forces in the Asia-Pacific. To the North, the island of Farallon de Medinilla in 
the Marianas is used by Air Force pilots as a practice bombing target. In addition, the US Armed 
Forces lease land on the island of Tinian, to be used as an emergency Air Force base in the event 
that one is needed. There are also various radar stations set up across the Compact states by US 
federal agencies, ostensibly for civilian purposes but rumored to have dual, intelligence-
collecting capabilities. 
The associated status of the Compact states can be useful to US foreign policy in other 
ways, as when Palau accepted six Uighur prisoners from Guantanamo Bay in 2010 after no other 
country would agree to house them.
98
 Additionally, as independent nations, they hold seats in the 
United Nations General Assembly, where they vote with the United States on nearly every 
resolution – all three are among the top 10 nations in UN General Assembly voting affinity with 
the US.
99
 Overall, while the Compacts have been insufficient in meeting the economic needs of 
Micronesia, they have met the strategic needs of the United States remarkably well. 
The Larger Foreign Policy Context in the Asia-Pacific 
The Asia-Pacific has been a principle area of interest to American foreign policy from the 
Second World War to the present day. Immediately following the War, the United States enjoyed 
hegemonic great power status in the region. Today, the US remains mostly dominant in the 
Pacific while also being one of many great powers with interests in Asia. The state of affairs in 
the Asia-Pacific is frequently described as geopolitical “liberal world order” maintained by the 
United States and its network of allies and partners. American allies include the Compact States, 
Japan, South Korea, Australia, and the Philippines. American partners include nations like 
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Malaysia and Indonesia. American interests are today defined far more expansively than 
defending American territory – broadly speaking, the United States seeks to ensure political 
stability in Asia, guarantee freedom of navigation, promote American economic interests, and 
(sometimes) promote liberal-democratic values. These efforts are backed by America’s physical 
military posture in addition to the network of relationships and alliances.  
Historically, the maintenance of this order has required “grand strategy” in dealing with 
the Asia-Pacific. Foreign Policy expert Michael J Green defines five key tensions in US grand 
strategy in the Pacific: Europe v. Asia, China v. Japan, Protectionism v. Free Trade, Defining 
the Forward Defensive Line, and Self-Determination v. Universal Values.100 According to Green, 
these five questions can be used to understand the main considerations of American grand 
strategy in the region. For Micronesia – a small component part of the broader Asia-Pacific – the 
question of Defining the Forward Defensive Line has the most utility in understanding in finding 
a role for Micronesia, as the geographical boundaries of American interests have historically 
driven American regional engagement. 
The current geopolitical order is rapidly eroding. Even before the election of President 
Donald Trump, the United States was slowly losing relative power in the Pacific due to the rise 
of the political, economic, and military strength of China. American efforts to contain Chinese 
influence, such as the effort to boycott the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
have been unsuccessful. The rise of China is the inevitable result of China’s growing economy 
and large population, articulated thusly by American academic Robert Art: 
If Chinaʼs economy continues to grow for two more decades at anything close to the rate 
of the last two decades, then it will eventually rival and even surpass the United States in 
the size of its gross domestic product  . . . Even if its economy never catches up to 
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Americaʼs, Chinaʼs remarkable economic growth has already given it significant 
political influence in East Asia, and that influence will only grow as Chinaʼs economy 
continues to grow . . . If it continues to channel a healthy portion of its GDP into its 
military forces over several more decades, and if it makes a determined naval and air 
power projection effort, China might be able to deploy a maritime force that could 
contest Americaʼs supremacy at sea in East Asia.101 
 Given the economic reality, the rise of China is not a question of if but when, and 
eventually the United States will need to revise its priorities and find a sustainable geopolitical 
position in the Asia-Pacific. When this occurs, America should realize the value of Micronesia as 
a strategic asset and incorporate it into any new Asia-Pacific strategy.  
China in Oceania 
 For island nations, China offers a fundamentally different relationship than has the 
United States and its junior partners of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, which have 
traditionally acted as the political custodians for various parts of Oceania. China promotes non-
interference in the political systems of other countries as a core tenant of its foreign policy – for 
Beijing, there are no rogue states. These new dynamics first manifested in the Pacific around Fiji 
in 2006, after Commodore Frank Bainimarama staged a military coup and ousted Fiji’s elected 
government. New Zealand and Australia, Fiji’s traditional patrons, instituted a travel ban and 
sanctions to incentivize a restoration of the legitimate government. China however, embraced the 
coup, sextupling aid to Fiji and inviting the Commodore to the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.
102
 
With this action, China essentially displaced Australia and New Zealand as the predominant 
outside power in Fiji. Much of the increase in Chinese aid to Fiji came in the form of preferential 
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loans rather than grants, to fund infrastructure built by Chinese contractors, but without the legal 
or economic reform requirements of other outside aid. Given the example of Fiji, the United 
States cannot assume that the Compact States will remain indefinitely subservient to American 
interests. In recent years, China has continued to increase direct aid, long-term investment, and 
diplomatic engagement with all of the countries of Oceania.
103
 If the United States neglects 
Micronesia’s priorities for too long, and China offers a “better deal” as happened in Fiji, then it 
is entirely plausible that a Compact state with a fraying relationship with the United States (i.e. 
Palau) will switch allegiance to China and unilaterally terminate their Compact. 
 There is also mounting evidence that Beijing aims to become the dominant naval power 
in the Western Pacific. In Chinese security academia, the concept of the “two island chains” 
posits that China should seek in the short-term to establish strategic control within the “first 
island chain” (The East and South China Seas, including Taiwan) and in the medium term 
establish strategic control to the “second island chain” (running south from Tokyo Bay, along the 
Mariana Islands, Guam, and the Palauan islands).
104
 In particular, the concept of the second 
island chain is a direct challenge to American control of Western Micronesia and the strategic 
interior of the Asia-Pacific.   
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                                                   Figure 4: The First and Second Island Chains
105
 
 
Figure 5: This map shows America and the freely associated states in blue, US treaty allies in Green, and China in 
red. Note how the Compact states form the “strategic interior” of the Asia-Pacific. 
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American Strategy in the Pacific and Micronesia’s Role 
The best possible American response to the rise of China in Micronesia rests on how 
America seeks to define to forward defensive line. Is the forward defensive line our treaty allies 
on the Pacific Rim (Japan, South Korea) or all the way back in Hawai’i? If it is the former, 
maintaining control of Micronesia as the “strategic interior” is critical, as having it fall into the 
hands of an adversary would greatly reduce the capability of the United States to project power 
in East Asia. If the forward defensive line is instead set in Hawai’i (a determination that would 
leave behind the American citizens of the CNMI and Guam) then strategic control of Micronesia 
would still be critical in that it would deny the area to a potentially adversarial China. 
Throughout the history of the US-Micronesian relationship, this concept of “strategic denial” has 
been a driving force behind the American presence in the region, with the goal of preventing 
another nation using the region to launch a Pearl Harbor-style attack on the United States. In 
1898 and 1917 the United States defined the forward defensive line too close to the mainland and 
was therefore left vulnerable to military attack. Micronesia has also historically been considered 
a “fallback position” in the event of a loss of American predominance in Asia, particularly in the 
event that the US-Philippines relationship frays.
106
 Given this history, wherever one defines the 
forward defensive line still leaves a significant role for Micronesia. Unless some radically new 
understanding or accommodation is reached with China that leaves the United States feeling 
secure in the Asia-Pacific, then there remains significant reason to invest in the continued 
American strategic predominance of Micronesia.  
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Concluding Thoughts: How to Improve the US-Micronesian Relationship 
Should the United States continue to see a vital strategic interest in the region, American 
policymakers would be wise to not underestimate the people of Micronesia in future 
negotiations. First and foremost, the people of the islands have shouldered many of America’s 
most unseemly burdens, from the nuclear testing Eniwetok and Bikini to the Uighyer terrorists 
transferred to Palau from Guantanamo. They have sent their own sons and daughters, in per 
capita numbers higher than that of any US state, to serve and die for the United States in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. They have nearly-uniformly acted in good faith towards the United States despite 
the shortcomings, inconsistencies, and sometimes cruelties of American policymakers. From the 
end of the Second World War to today, the people of Micronesia have always been at the table, 
willing to work with America to find areas of mutual interest. Yet Kennedy appears to be the last 
President to appreciate how good America’s friends from the islands actually are.  
 Micronesian culture is highly rooted in traditional behaviors of respect and deference to 
elders. Social signals are often conveyed with facial expresses or pauses rather than words. 
Micronesians tend to wait long after another is done speaking to contribute their own opinions. 
Because of this, the American administrators of the TTPI often found it awkward to chat with the 
local Micronesians.107 This cultural divide combined with subtle American racism to create the 
idea that the Micronesians were slow, unintelligent, and unambitious. In fact, the Micronesians 
were exercising their traditional form of respect. When the negotiations for political status began 
in earnest in the late 1960s, the Micronesians carefully crafted a set of demands and a strategy to 
obtain them. They outmaneuvered the Americans on nearly every issue – not out of bad faith, but 
because the Americans never came to the table treating the Micronesians as equals. 
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 First and foremost, Americans should learn more about the Compacts, the history of the 
US-Micronesian relationship, and why previous generations have viewed the region as being of 
great strategic utility to the United States. Should one believe my central argument, that this 
relationship is both critical to US interests and highly underappreciated, then it follows that the 
US can and should examine ways in which these mutual ties could be strengthened. The stakes 
are clear: the Compacts are mutual agreements that can be terminated unilaterally, the rise of 
China threatens the political status quo in Oceania, and there is no concrete reason for the 
Micronesians to remain in the American camp if China offers a better deal, especially given 
years of American neglect. 
 The Micronesian political class is not terribly ideological, but immensely practical. They 
have no grand illusions that their countries will reach western levels of prosperity or ever truly be 
outside of the sphere of influence of a foreign power. They have thus learned to navigate their 
political situation with practicality. Under the Spanish and Germans, this meant forcing the 
colonial powers to work within local power structures. Under the militant Japanese, it meant 
keeping down their heads until the storm had passed. Under the Americans, who brought 
something resembling democratic values and the rule of law to the islands, they used every 
available opportunity to enhance their political status and leverage more aid and autonomy from 
the TTPI negotiations. The Micronesians today are not hostile to the Compacts of Free 
Association, but are keenly aware of the flaws of the arrangement. They realize without naiveté 
that the foremost American concern has always been geopolitical and they are not oblivious to 
the rise of China as another world-shaking event for their tiny nations. In FSM President Peter 
Christian’s Inaugural address, he publically said as much:  
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The World Wars have ended.  The cold war, a secret myth of yesterday.  And in all such 
sad conflicts, there are those who claim victory. But, victors must be humble in their 
triumphs.  Many nations involved in the conflicts have risen from the debris of war to 
become dominant economic powers in the world. They now wage economic wars against 
each other often leaving in their wake victims of selfish globalization. And where they are 
generous, often this generosity comes with a Pavlovian leash. 
108
 
It is worth noting, perhaps, this same President Christian was invited to Beijing by 
Chinese President Xi Jinping, where he was treated to the equivalent of a state dinner, at which 
two discussed Chinese investment in Micronesia, opportunities for cultural exchange, and their 
shared concern over climate change.
109
 Perhaps above anything, China’s newfound and 
enthusiastic engagement in Micronesia should serve as evidence to the United States of the 
continued importance of these tiny islands.   
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